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Abstract
There is controversy between regulators and audit firms over the policy of mandatory
audit firm rotation. Many regulators favor mandatory audit firm rotation whereas audit firms are
against such a policy. Regulators argue that mandatory firm rotation would improve audit quality
while audit firms claim that audit quality increases with audit tenure.
Typically, regulators and audit firms refer to academic research that supports their
position. One early paper on mandatory audit firm rotation that is commonly cited by academics
and opponents of mandatory rotation is Carcello and Nagy (2004), which finds that longer audit
tenure does not reduce audit quality. This Honors Thesis reevaluates the methodology and
conclusions drawn by Carcello and Nagy. I find that the sample of audit failures used in that
study is not well suited for drawing conclusions about the effect of audit tenure on audit quality.
Also, I find that the paper’s lack of transparency regarding the sample firms included in the
statistical analysis makes the paper’s research design difficult to evaluate or replicate.
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Introduction
Financial statements communicate financial information to parties outside an entity. Due
to possible conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, public companies are
required to have their financial statements audited by a public accounting firm. The audit
enhances the quality of the financial information reported by management and increases investor
confidence in the reliability of the information. The purpose of an audit is to provide reasonable
assurance that the financial statements of a company are not materially misstated due to fraud or
error. The quality of an audit depends on the likelihood that the auditor will detect a material
misstatement or omission and the auditor’s behavior subsequent to the detection of a material
misstatement. Audit quality is improved when material misstatements are detected and corrected.
Audit tenure is the length of the client-auditor relationship (i.e., the number of years the
auditor has audited the client). Audit tenure can affect audit quality. However, whether long
tenure improves audit quality or compromises audit quality is unclear. For example, in 1987, the
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting recommended that the peer review
program of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section pay more attention to the first-year audits of
public clients due to the fact that the review of fraud-related cases by the Commission illustrated
that a large majority of the fraud cases involved companies that had recently changed auditors
(National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987, 54).
On the other hand, the International Federation of Accountants published a report in July
2003, called Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting, which states that excessive
familiarity would result in an auditor being more compliant and less hesitant to challenge
management when appropriate regarding the accounting practices, procedures, and internal
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controls (IFAC 2003). Also, Louwers (1998) finds that long tenure decreases the likelihood that
the auditor will issue a going-concern opinion for a distressed client.
Proponents and opponents of mandatory audit firm rotation sometimes refer to academic
research to support their positions. Carcello and Nagy (2004) has been an influential paper that is
often cited as evidence that longer audit tenure does not reduce audit quality. The paper conducts
a statistical analysis on a sample of companies that violated the antifraud provision of the
Securities Act of 1934 (Rule 10b-5), comparing the tenure of their auditors with a control sample
of non-fraud companies.
This Honors Thesis examines whether Carcello and Nagy (2004) drew appropriate
conclusions about the effect of audit firm tenure on audit quality. I attempt to replicate the
Carcello and Nagy sample. I find that a large majority of the short-tenure auditors were auditing
firms that had recently gone through initial public offerings. It is well known that companies
going public pose a greater risk of financial statement fraud than established public companies,
and also that the nature of private company audits differs significantly from public company
audits. I also find that the number of 10b-5 violations among medium and long-tenure auditors is
so small that statistical tests may not be powerful enough to detect whether long tenure
negatively affects auditor quality. Taken together, this evidence about the Carcello and Nagy
sample suggests that the conclusions drawn by the authors may not be warranted. Furthermore, I
identify a lack of transparency in the Carcello and Nagy paper that makes replication of their
study and evaluation of their research difficult. These potential weaknesses with their study are
particularly important insofar as their paper is cited by opponents of mandatory audit firm
rotation in the context of the public policy debate over rotation.
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Background on Mandatory Auditor Rotation Regulation
The global aftermath of the Enron Scandal and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 led to stricter regulation for audits of public companies and their corporate governance.
The new rules include an enhanced role for corporate audit committees, and independent
inspections of accounting firms that audit public companies. The post-SOX environment has
heightened awareness of factors that influence audit quality.
Concerns about audit quality have been raised for many years, and the accounting
profession’s self-regulatory environment in the 1980s and 1990s created high levels of audit risk
and auditor engagement risk. However, the Enron scandal in 2001 commenced a global shift to
more regulation that was led by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which imposed major changes
for U.S. auditing standards, financial reporting standards, and corporate governance. Some
changes included oversight of public company audits and their auditors by a new independent
agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, restriction of consulting services to
public company audit clients, and a requirement for greater engagement with the auditors by the
company’s audit committee. In other countries, similar changes were enacted into legislation. In
the United Kingdom, for instance, the Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Inspection Unit was
established.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the U.S. Comptroller General to study and
evaluate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation, and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
released its study in 2003. The GAO study stated “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the
most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003). However, the GAO also
stated that if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not lead to better audit quality, then mandatory audit
7

firm rotation may be necessary.

The Potential for Archival Research to Influence Public Policy: Carcello Citings
The potential for archival research to influence public policy is reflected in several
comment letters submitted to the PCAOB in connection with its Concept Release on Auditor
Independence and Audit Firm Rotation (2011) as well as recent academic accounting
publications.
The Auditing Standards Board, which is a part of the AICPA, submitted a comment letter
to the PCAOB opposing audit firm rotation. In its comment letter, the Auditing Standards Board
cites the Carcello and Nagy study in the Audit Quality section, which asserts that audit failures
are more likely to occur on newly acquired clients in the earlier years of the auditor-client
relationship.
Michael Meyer, Associate Professor in the Department of Accountancy at the University
of Notre Dame, submitted a comment letter that questioned whether “truncating the auditorclient relationship will lead to better judgments on the part of the auditor” (Meyer 2012). The
only support that Meyer provides for his position was a published research paper he had
coauthored, which he included with his comment letter. The research paper cites Carcello and
Nagy as providing evidence of a higher incidence of financial statement fraud in the earlier years
of the auditor-client relationship (Meyer, Rigsby and Boone 2007, 54).
More recently, the Carcello and Nagy study was cited in a survey article of academic
research on auditor independence. The article identifies Carcello and Nagy as one of several
archival studies that do not link longer audit tenure with reduced financial reporting quality
(Church et al. 2015).
8

Summary of Carcello and Nagy
The motivation for Carcello and Nagy (2004) was to use rigorous research methodology
instead of anecdotal evidence to prove or disprove whether mandatory audit firm rotation would
improve audit quality. Carcello and Nagy (2004) comments that public policy, which would
impact over 17,000 SEC registrants in regards to the cost of quality of auditing services, should
not be shaped by solely opinions, but contextual facts.
Carcello and Nagy (2004) tests two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states: “Fraudulent
financial reporting is more likely given short auditor tenure (three years of less) as compared
with medium auditor tenure (four to eight years).” This hypothesis is based on the primary
argument against mandatory audit firm rotation, which is that audit quality is worse in the early
years of the auditor-client relationship. This may occur because the auditor is unfamiliar with the
client’s business, operations, systems, controls, and accounting policies. Hypothesis II states
“Fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure (nine years or more) as
compared with medium auditor tenure (four to eight years).” This hypothesis is based on the
primary argument for mandatory audit firm rotation that long auditor tenure leads to a reduction
in audit quality because auditors become complacent, fail to maintain professional skepticism, or
develop relationships with their clients such that the auditors are willing to accommodate their
clients’ aggressive financial reporting practices.
The study tests the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting
using the following logistic regression model:
FRAUD = β0 + β1SHORT + β2 LONG + β3 SIZE + β4 ZFC + β5YRSPUB + β6 MKTBK + β7 CPA
+ β8 BDOUT + β9 BDSIZE + β10 BOSS + ε
9

Audit firm tenure was measured as the number of consecutive years that the audit firm
has audited the client (found by counting backwards from the year the fraud began). A SHORT
audit tenure was three years or less and a LONG audit tenure was nine years or more. 1 The
resources utilized to compute audit firm tenure were the Standard & Poor’s Research Insight
(version 7.6), proxy statements, EDGAR and the Q-Data SEC files microfiche collection, and
annual editions of Who Audits America.
SIZE is the natural log (in millions) of total assets. ZFC is Zmijewski’s 1984 financial
condition score, which is a bankruptcy indicator (Zmijewski 1984). YRSPUB is the number of
years the company has been listed on a national stock exchange. MKTBK is the ratio of the
company’s market value to its book value. CPA is an indicator variable indicating whether the
auditor is a Big 6 firm. BDOUT is the percentage of the company’s board of directors who are
independent directors. BDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. BOSS is an indicator
variable for whether the CEO or President is also the Chairman of the board of directors.
The regression was run using two alternative populations of control firms. The first
population was a matched sample, where each fraud firm was matched to a non-fraud firm for
year, industry, and size. The second population of control firms (called the “full-population”)
was all other public companies available on the Research Insight database between 1988 and
2000.
To create the sample, all the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)
issued by the SEC between 1990 and 2001 were read, where the first year of the fraudulent

1

Although not included in the regression, medium tenure obviously includes firms with an audit

tenure from four to eight years.
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reporting was after 1987. There were 267 companies subject to AAER’s that violated Rule 10b-5
during the 12 year period of the study. Companies were eliminated from the sample if the
financial statements or audit report were unavailable, the proxy statement was unavailable, the
companies were banks or insurance firms, the company’s first reporting year is a fraud year (no
clean year), the researchers were unable to find a matched firm, the researchers were unable to
determine the first fraud year, or the researchers were unable to determine auditor tenure. The
final sample size of fraud firms for the matched-pairs analysis was 104 and the final sample of
fraud firms for the full population analysis was 147. See Table 1, which is reprinted from
Carcello and Nagy (2004).
Table 1

Initial Sample
Financial Statements or audit
report unavailable
Proxy statement information
unavailable
AAERs affecting banks or
insurance firms
First reporting year is a fraud
year (no clean year)
Unable to match
Unable to determine first
fraud year per AAER
Unable to determine auditor
tenure
Final Sample

Sample Description
Matched-Pair Analysis
267
(59)

Full-Population Analysis
267
(59)

(28)

NA

(27)

(27)

(25)

(25)

(15)
(6)

NA
(6)

(3)

(3)

104

147

Both logistic regressions find a statistically significant relationship between short auditor
tenure and fraud (significant at the 1 percent level). Also, both regressions fail to find a
11

significant relationship between long auditor tenure and fraud. Control variables that were found
to be negatively associated with fraud and significant at the 1 percent level in both regressions
were the number of years the company had been public and whether the auditor was a Big 6
firm. Also, in the matched pairs analysis, the following control variables were significant at the 1
percent level: the market-to-book ratio, the percentage of outside directors, and whether the
CEO/President is also the Board Chairman. The authors conclude that the results of their study
support the argument that long audit tenure does not have an adverse effect on audit quality.

Replication of Carcello and Nagy
As discussed in the introduction, this study is driven by the desire to determine whether
the conclusions drawn by Carcello and Nagy (2004) are supported by the study’s data and
methodology. Two concerns about the Carcello and Nagy sample are (1) there may be two few
medium and long audit tenure frauds to provide a sufficiently powerful test on the variable
LONG, and (2) the variable YRSPUB may not adequately control for the relationship between
audit quality and companies that have recently gone public. It is difficult to alleviate these
concerns with the information provided about the fraud companies in Carcello and Nagy (2004).
From the paper’s table of descriptive statistics (Table 2), one can infer that the number of longtenure fraud firms in the matched-sample analysis was approximately 21 (out of a total fraud
sample of 104), and in the full-population analysis was approximately 25 (out of a total fraud
sample of 147). There were approximately 36 medium-tenure fraud firms in the matched-sample
analysis and approximately 45 medium-tenure fraud firms in the full-population analysis. Also,
we know that the mean for the years-public control variable was approximately 8 years for the
matched-pairs analysis fraud sample (with a standard deviation of 5.5) and the mean was
12

approximately 6 years for the full-population analysis fraud sample (with a standard deviation of
4). This data would seem to indicate that a large number of fraud firms had recently gone public.
The goal of this Honors Thesis was to conduct a small sample study of the fraud firms with more
detailed information about audit tenure, auditor transition, and the years since the company went
public. For this purpose, the first step was to replicate the Carcello and Nagy sample. 2

Sample Selection
Using the SEC website, I identified all companies other than financial institutions and
insurance companies, from 1994 to 2001, that violated Rule 10b-5. 1994 was chosen as the start
of my sample period because this was the first year that the SEC made filings available to the
public on its website. 2001 was selected as the last year to coincide with the end of the time
period examined in Carcello and Nagy (2004). This selection process identified 88 companies.
To follow Carcello and Nagy, firms were eliminated based on the following factors:
(a) The financial statements or the audit report was unavailable;
(b) The first reporting year is a fraud year;
(c) I was unable to determine the first year of fraud;
(d) I was unable to determine audit tenure;
(e) I was unable to determine if the company went public within nine years of the fraud.

2

I contacted Professor Carcello to ask if I could receive a list of the firms used in Carcello and

Nagy (2004). Professor Carcello told me that he no longer had the data.
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The final number of companies in my sample was 22. See Table 2 below.
Table 2
Sample
Initial Sample
Financial Statements or audit report unavailable
Proxy statement information unavailable
First reporting year is a fraud year (no clean year)
Unable to determine first fraud year per AAER
Unable to determine if IPO was in the last 9 years
Unable to determine auditor tenure
Final Sample

88
0
0
(32)
(5)
(17)
(12)
22

My sample of 22 firms should be a subset of the Carcello and Nagy sample of 147 firms.
I was only able to identify approximately 15% of the original sample. The reasons for this
include the fact that my sample excludes the first four years of the original sample, and I did not
have access to the Research Insight database. To obtain the information required for my sample,
in addition to the SEC website, I used Who Audits America and web-based news and information
sources.
Table 3 identifies each company in my sample, the first year of the fraud, and the number
of years from the time the audit firm first audited the company (as a public company) until the
first year of the fraud, up to a maximize of nine years (the cutoff in Carcello and Nagy for
identifying the auditor as a long-tenure auditor). Hence, the first year in my calculation of auditor
tenure is either the year the company went public, or the year the company hired the audit firm
that was still conducting the audit in the first year of fraud, or the ninth year prior to the first year
of fraud. A key feature explicit in my analysis, and implicit in Carcello and Nagy, is that audits
of public companies are generally considered riskier than audits of private companies, and
14

consequently, auditors may conduct more thorough, in-depth audits and/or make more
conservative audit reporting decisions on public company audits.
Table 3
Name of Company

1st Year of
Fraud

DCI Telecommunications
Laser Technology
Amazon Natural Treasures
Secure Sign
Millennium Software Solutions
Engineering Animation
Vari-L
MAX Internet Communication
Sensorormatic Electronics
Trinity Gas
Phoenix Metals USA
Presstek
Atratech
Informix Corp.
System Software Associates Inc.
Ferrofluidics Corp.
Fabric-Centers of America
Guildford Mills
New Jersey Resources
Venator Group
Kellogg & Andelson
Waste Management

1995
1993
1997
1999
1997
1999
1996
1999
1993
1996
1989
1997
1997
1995
1994
1991
1992
1997
1992
1993
1993
1999

# Yrs.
Counting
Backwards
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
6
6
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

First year of
auditor tenure
determined by:
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
IPO
auditor switch
auditor switch
auditor switch
IPO date
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Exhibit A shows audit tenure counting backwards from the first year of the fraud to either the
IPO or the most recent auditor switch. Companies with audit tenures of nine or more years were
public for at least nine years prior to the fraud, and used the same auditor during that time. The
exhibit illustrates two important points. First, less than 15% of the sample are neither short audit
tenure, nor long audit tenure firms. Second, for half of the sample, the same auditor had audited
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the company—as a public company—for only one or two years. It should also be noted that
while approximately one-third of our fraud sample are long audit tenure firms, which is about
equal to the 37% for long tenure non-fraud firms in Carcello and Nagy’s full population analysis,
Carcello and Nagy’s sample of long tenure fraud firms is only 17% of its full population
analysis. Hence, unlike the descriptive statistics in Carcello and Nagy (Table 2 in that paper), the
characteristics of my sample provides no evidence that long audit tenure reduces the likelihood
of fraud.

Exhibit A

Audit Tenure
8

Number of Observations

7
6
5
4

3
2
1
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 or more

Audit Tenure (Years)

Discussion, Analysis, and Conclusion
In my sample, 55% of the fraud cases were short audit tenures, compared to 52% in the
fraud sample for the full population analysis in Carcello and Nagy, although only 25% of the
non-fraud firms were short audit tenures in Carcello and Nagy’s full population analysis. In that
16

respect, my fraud sample is consistent with their fraud sample. Importantly, however, half of the
companies with fraudulent financial reporting in my sample occurred within the first two years
of the company’s initial public offering, and this could be true in Carcello and Nagy’s sample as
well, since the number of years the company was public had a mean of 6 for the full population
analysis and the standard deviation was 4. Although Carcello and Nagy include the number of
years as a public company as a control variable, if in fact nearly half of their sample consists of
companies that had been public for only one or two years before the fraud, one might question
whether this control variable fully accounts for the three-way interaction among fraud, auditor
tenure, and years as a public company. Since audit risk associated with companies that have
recently gone public may be higher than companies that have been public for many years but
have recently switched auditors, it would seem that a better research design would examine only
companies that had been public for a minimum number of years. This would ensure that short
audit tenure firms are limited to firms that actually switched auditors while they were public
companies. As it stands, Carcello and Nagy’s conclusions may not be particularly informative
about audit risk associated with short auditor tenures.
The conclusions of my paper are consistent with Church et al. (2015). That article’s main
point was to analyze selected academic studies in relation to auditor independence and evaluate
the differential findings between experimental and archival studies. Church et al. found that
experimental research sometimes supports regulators’ concerns that long tenure compromises
independence, while archival research frequently fails to find such an association. Church et al.
(2015) attribute the differences in results between the two methodologies to how researchers
study independence breaches. It is my conclusion that the research design in Carcello and Nagy
(2004) may not have been well-suited to addressing the benefits of mandatory firm rotation.
17

Another weakness in Carcello and Nagy’s research design is the following. If long audit
tenures compromise objectivity of the auditor client relationship, then without a law in place
requiring mandatory audit firm rotation, it is very difficult to measure the benefits of such a law.
Without mandatory rotation, auditors have incentives to compromise auditor independence to
satisfy clients, in order to retain the audit engagement and maintain the revenue stream from the
client. If the auditor knows that the auditor-client relationship will end, then this incentive will be
eliminated. Carcello and Nagy (2004) might pick up the benefits of the greater knowledge that
long tenure provides the auditor, but their study cannot incorporate the benefits that might accrue
when the auditor knows that the auditor/client relationship will terminate in the foreseeable
future.
Carcello and Nagy (2004) also fail to adequately consider another point. They encourage
the use of statistical methods to analyze the benefits of mandatory firm rotation: “Therefore, it is
critical that public policy regarding mandatory firm rotation is shaped by research and not
anecdote” (p. 56). This statement fails to appreciate the role that anecdotes play in influencing
investor confidence and financial markets. Audit failures are extremely low probability events
(about 1/5 of 1% as computed using the data in Carcello and Nagy) and difficult to predict using
statistical models. However, most of the high-profile audit failures (or alleged failures) have
occurred in companies with long audit tenures. These audit failures include Waste Management
in 1999, HealthSouth in 1999, Enron in 2001, Lehman in 2008, and Olympus Corporation
(which the public learned about in 2011). All of these companies used Big 4 (Big 5) audit firms.
In each of these cases, forensic investigation of the frauds strongly suggest that the auditors may
have compromised their independence. Even if, on average, long tenure does not reduce audit
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quality, regulators and lawmakers are understandably motivated to take reasonable steps to
minimize the probability of similar audit failures in the future.
Finally, it should be noted that the existence of a well-functioning independent board or
independent audit committee, which is required by section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, may
indicate that the arguments for mandatory audit firm rotation are less relevant today than prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley. The purpose of the independent board or audit committee is to uphold the
interests of shareholders and to ensure the objectivity of the audit process. In 2003, the
International Federation of Accountants wrote that the audit committee needs to directly interact
with management and the auditors in certain areas that have typically been handled by people
outside the audit committee. Usually, the function of the audit committee and the effectiveness of
mandatory audit firm rotation have been thought of as independent matters, however the quality
of financial statement audits may actually be directly influenced by the function of the audit
committee. The audit committee has the responsibility to oversee the financial reporting process
and the external audit. Therefore, the role of the committee should be included when debating
mandatory audit firm rotation (Chi, 2010).
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